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Abstract
The recent European experience of high persistent unemployment has led to
:.he development of theories of unemployment hysteresis embodying the idea that
the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the history of the actual
ur;?mployment rate. This paper summarizes two directions of research on
hysteresis that appear especially promising. Membership theories are based on
the distinction between insiders and outsiders and explore the idea that wage
setting is largely determined by firms' incumbent workers rather than by the
unemployed. Duration theories explore the idea that the long term unemployed
exert much less downwards pressure on wages than do the short term unemployed.
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Standard macroeconomic models make a sharp distinction between
equilibrium and actual unemployment. Equilibrium unemployment is determined by
labor market institutions, moves slowly and is unaffected by actual
unemployment. Unexpected movements in demand and supply lead to deviations of
actual unemployment from equilibrium ; these deviations in turn trigger changes
in the rate of inflation, which lead eventually to a return to equilibrium
unemplojonent
.
The European experience of the last ten years, like the Depression of the
1930' s, strongly suggests that the standard model may not capture important
aspects of reality. As actual unemployment has gone; up, equilibrium
unemployment, as estimated from Phillips curve relations, has risen in tandem.
Today, unemployment in the EEC exceeds 11%. But, were it not for the fall in
the price of oil and the depreciation of the dollar, inflation would be roughly
constant. Put another way, the actual level of unemployment appears to be the
equilibrium level. While this could as a matter of logic be due to shocks
increasing both the equilibrium and the actual rates, empirical attempts to
identify such shocks have failed. Lower productivity growth and higher oil
prices may help explain the 70' s, but there are very few identifiable adverse
shocks which can explain a doubling of equilibrium unemployment in the 80' s.
The recent European experience has led to the development of alternative
theories of unemployment embodying the idea that the equilibrixom unemployment
rate depends on the history of the actual unemployment rate. Such theories
may be labelled hvsteresis theories after the term in the physical sciences
referring to situations where equilibrium is path- dependent. Two directions
1 Strictly speaking, the word hysteresis should be used only in the case where
there is path dependence of steady state equilibrium unemployment. We shall use
it more loosely to denote cases where actual unemployment affects equilibrium
unemployment for a long time. The idea that the macroeconomy may exhibit
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of research on hysteresis appear very promising. Both focus on the labor mar":et
and the relation of unemployment to wage setting. First membership theories
are based on the distinction between insiders and outsiders and explore the
idea that wage setting is largely determined by firms' incumbent workers rather
than by the unemployed. Second, duration theories are based on the distinction
between short term and long term unemployed and explore the idea that the long
term unemployed exert little pressure on wage setting. This paper shows, using
a simple macroeconomic model, how these theories can, singly or together,
explain high persistent unemployment.
In what follows, we focus on wage bargaining. To do so, we make the
conventional -but not uncontroversial- assumption that wage bargaining
determines the nominal wage, with firms being free to choose emplo\Tiient ex
post. Therefore we first specify the demand for labor. We then consider th?
implications of alternative wage setting mechanisms for the persistence of
unemployment. We start with the pure insider case, in which the wage is set by
insiders, with no pressure from outsiders on wage setting and then consider the
more general case where outsiders exert some pressure. Finally, we study the
case where not all outsiders exert the same pressure on wage bargains.
1. The derived demand for labor.
There are many firms in the economy. The demand facing each firm is a
function of aggregate demand, which itself depends on real money balances, and
hysteresis is not new. Hysteresis effects were for example discussed in Phelps
(1972). An analysis of their implications for policy may be found in Sachs
(1985) . Other recent papers examining hysteresis explanations for the European
experience are discussed below.

its own price relative to the overall price level. For simplicity, we assiame
that the only potential source of fluctuations in the economy is nominal money,
which, if prices do not adjust, affects aggregate demand and employment. All
the variables in what follows are in logarithms and we ignore all unimportant
constants. Formally, the demand facing firm i is given by :
(1) y^^ - (m-p) - a(p^-p) ; a >1
where y. , p. are the firm's output and nominal price, and m and p are
nominal money and the price level.
Each firm operates under constant returns to scale, so that y. " ri. , where
n. is employment in firm i ; given constant marginal cost and constant
elasticity of demand, profit maximisation implies p. ~ ^^ . where w. is the
nominal wage paid by firm i. Using these relations, and noting that p - w,
where w is the aggregate nominal wage index, we obtain a derived demand for
labor by firm i :
(2) n^ - (m-w) - a(w^-W)
Employment in each firm depends on real money balances in wage units, and
on the relative wage paid by the firm. The determination of employment along
this derived demand curve depends on the process of wage setting, to which we
now turn. In all cases, we assume that nominal wage bargains are set before
nominal money is known.
2
2. Wage setting in a pure insider model
2 The idea that wages are the result of a bargain between insiders and the firm
has been explored in a series of contributions by Lindbeck ard Snower ((1985)
for example). Gregory (1986), looking at Australia, was the first to argue that
insider considerations could explain high sustained unemployment. The
implications for aggregate unemployment have also been examined by Lindbeck and
Snower (1984), Blanchard and Summers (1986a) and Gottfries and Horn (1986). The
analysis of this section relies heavily on Blanchard and Summers.

In the simplest insider model, there is associated with each firm i a
group of workers, the insiders or incumbents, with membership n.*. They are the
OT.ly ones whose interests are represented in wage bargaining. Furthermore, they
have priority in tmployment ; only when all insiders are employed can the. firm
hire outsiders.
The assumption that wages are set primarily with regard to the interests
of incumbent workers is easily justified. In unionized settings, wage
decisions whether made by median voters or senior workers are likely to give
little weight to the interests of unemployed members and less to the interests
of non-members. Ir non-union settings incumbent workers are likely to have
bargaining power because of the fixed costs of hiring a new worker, and because
of they can threaten to withhold effort. The differ--».ntial importance of
incumbent workers in wage setting decisions is exemplified by the reluctance of
unions to accept two tier contracts. Their reluctance stems from fears that
eventually wage decisions will come to be made not in the interests of current
member.^ but insteac In the interests of new lower tier workers.
Assuming that, in each firm, the group of insiders is sufficiently strong
to set the wage unilate: ally and sets it so as to make expected employment be
3
equal to the size of the membership we have;
(3) Enj^ - n.*,
This in turn implies, using (2), that the nominal wage satisfies Em-Ew-
3 Derivation from first principles yields in general a more complex outcome.
In Elanchard and Summers, for example, inriders set the wage so as to make the
probability of employment equal to some constant. If insiders set the
probability sufficiently high, this implies that expected employment exceeds
m-imbership. Although, in average, some outsiders are hired, they are hired to
decrease the risk to insiders of being laid off.
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a(w. -Ew)-n,*. Given that all firms and groups of workers are the s.ame, arid that
the only shocks are aggregate nominal shocks, all groups of workers choose the
same nominal wage. Thus, w. - w — Ew. Replacing in (2), and dropping the index
i as employment is the same in all firms
n - n* + (m-Em)
Employment is equal to membership plus a disturbance, equal to the
unanticipated movement in nominal money.
The crucial issue in the context of this model is how membership is
determined. If we think of the group of workers as a union, who does the union
represent when it sets the wage ? Almost surely, the union will care more about
the currently employed than about others. If, for example, it cires only about
the workers employed at the time of bargaining, n,* is equal to n.(-l)..
Substituting in the previous equation yields:
(5) n - n(-l) + (m-Em)
The implications of such a membership rule for employment are drastic :
employment follows a random walk
,
with the innovations being due to unexpected
movements in aggregate demand. For a given labor force, equilibrium
unemployment is equal to last period's value of actual unemployment in the
standard terminology. The economy shows no tendency to return to any fixed
equilibrium value. The mechanism behind this result is transparent : after an
adverse shock which reduces employment, workers who are still employed have no
desire to cut the nominal wage so as to increase employment. After a favorable
shock which increases emplo3nnent, some outsiders are now employed and will have
no desire to increase wages and to price themselves out of employment.
.
The connection between membership and employment is probably not as tight
as we have portrayed it. Recently laid off workers may well still be considered

insiders ; recently hired outsiders may well not be considered insiders. New
entrants to the labor force but with family ties to insiders may be treated as
insiders. If for example it takes a few periods of unemploymen*" to lose insider
status, and a few periods of employment to acquire it, the dynamics of
employment are more complex, and in an interesting way. In this case, it takes
a longer sequence of unexpected shocks of the same sign, an unlikely event, to
change membership. Thus, most of the time, equilibrium employment is stable,
and unaffected by movements in the actual rate. But once in a while, a sequence
of shocks pushes the equilibrium rate up or down, where it remains until
another sequence dislodges it. Such infrequent changes appear to fit quite well
with the empirical evidence on unemployment : unemployment seems indeed to be
subject to infrequent changes in its mean level.
3. Wage setting with some pressure from outsiders
Assuming, as we have done above, that outsiders have no effect on wage
setting, is too strong. First, new firms may hire the outsiders, and through
competition in the goods market, force insiders in other firms to accept lower
wages. To the extent however that new firms must pay fixed costs to set up
production, they may find that, if the economy is depressed and unemployment is
high, the size of the market they can enter does not make entry, even at low
wages, an attractive option. Indeed, entry seems to occur mostly when
unemployment is low, not when it is high.
Even if entry is not an issue, there are two other channels through which
unemployment may still affect the wage in existing firms. Higher unemployment
means worse reeemployment prospects if laid off, and thus should lead the

insiders to accept a lower wage and a higher probability of employment. Higher
unc r;ployment also implies that replacing the insiders in part or in toto by a
new group c f lower paid outsider workers is a more attractive option for the
firm. Hiring outsiders against the will of the insiders may be costly, as
insiders may well harass the outsiders ; replacing the whole labor force may
also be costly, because of the presence of specific human capital. But a large
enough wage differential between the employed and the unemployed may
nevertheless make it attractive and strengthen the hand of the firm in
bargaining.
We can capture these effects by modifying equation (3) to read :
(3') En^^-n^^* - b(n-En) ; b >
where n is the labor force and En is expected employment , so that (n-En)
is expected unemployment. The stronger the effect of unemployment on wage
setting, the larger the expected level of employment in firm 1, the lower the
nominal wage w. . Let us assume that n.* — n.(-l), the membership rule, which in
the absence of pressure from outsiders, leads to a random walk in employment.
Solving, as before, for the level of employment gives :
(6) n-n - (l/(l+b)) (n(-l)-n) + (m-Em)
.
Employment now follows a first order process around the level of the -
labor force. Thus, if the labor force evolves slowly over time, unemployment
also follows approximately a first order autoregression. The degree of
persistence is a function of b. If b is equal to zero, employment follows a
random walk. As b increases however, the degree of persistence decreases. After
4 The implicaticiis of the ability of insiders to cooperate or harass outsiders
has been explored by Lindbeck and Snower (1986), under the assumption of Nash
bargaining between insiders and outsiders.
5 Actual employment is not known at the time of bargaining.
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an adverse shock for example, actual unemployment increases, and so does
Gquilibrium unereployment ; in the absence of subsequent surprises, unemployment
eventually returns to a given value. But, during the transition, short run
equilibrium unemplo^^inent is high.
If we look at richer membership rules, the results parallel those of the
previous section. If it takes time to lose or acquire membership, only long
sequence of shocks of the same sign will change equilibrium unemployment. Once
it has changed however, it will only slowly (if b is small) go back to its
initial value.
A. UnemploN'Tiient Duration and the Wage Setting Process
Tne first model we presented assumed that the unemployed had no effect on
vage setviing while the model of the previous section assumed that all the
unemployed exerted some downward pressure on the wage. A plausible intermediate
position is that only the short term unemployed who have worked recently exert
downward pressure on wages. Empirical results by Layard and Nickell (1986), and
Nickell (1986), suggest that this is indeed the case. Running a variety of wage
equations, they conclude that most if not all of the pressure on wages comes in
the IIK from those vmemployed one year or less. There is little noticeable
e-fect of the long term unemployed on wages.
There are a nimber of complementary explanations for why the long term
unemployed might exert less influence on wage setting than those who have been
out of work only briefly. Most obviously, skills may atrophy with protracted
unemployment to the point where workers productivity falls below their
reservation wage, or the wage which insider workers allow firms to offer.
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There is however little empirical evidence from either historical or
microeconomic data to support this possibility. An alternative possibility is
that workers' reservation wage or search intensity may decline as their
unemployment spell continues. This may be because they adjust to a lower
standard of living, become addicted to living on unemployment insurance
benefits, or become discouraged about the prospects for reemployment. This
effect and the insider effects discussed above are mutually reinforcing.
Insider effects imply that a worker is less likely to be reemployed as his
spell of unemployment lengthens. The discouragement of the long term
unemployed in turn strengthens the hand of insiders in wage se~ting.
Assuming initially that short term unemployment is roughly equal to the
change in unemployment, (we return below to the appropriateness of this
assi'jnption) equation (3') may be modified to read:
(3") En^^ - n^* - b(n(-l)-En)
Thus, we assume that wage pressure from the outsiders depends not on total
unemployment, but on (expected) short term unemployment. Assuming that the
membership rule for insiders is still n.* - n.(-l), and solving for aggregate
employment gives :
(7) n - n(-l) + (m-Em)
We recover our initial result that employment follows a -.andom walk. This
is now the result of both the behavior of insiders, and the fact that only the
short term unemployed put pressure on wages.
This full persistence result is however too strong. The c^mamic relation
6 Another possibility is that the long term unemployed exert less pressure on
wages because employers treat protracted unemployment as an adverse signal.
Rational employers will however revise upwards their assessment of the ability
of the long term unemployed when macroeconomic developments beyord the control
of any single worker increase long term unemployment.
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between short term and total unemployment is in fact a complex dynamic
relation, where the level of short term unemployment depends both on changes in
and the level of unemployment. An increase in the flow into unemployment
initially sharply increases the fraction of short term unemployment, but may
eventually be associated with a decrease in this fraction as total unemployment
rises. Even taking account of these complications, the general result remains
that if the long term unemployed exert little or no pressure on wages, an
increase in long term unemployment increases equilibrium unemployment for some
time. Like the insider model, this implies that short sequences of shocks will
have little effect on equilibrium unemployment, while long sequences will
increase equilibrium unemployment for some time.
5. Conclusion
While they appear to be able to explain the broad macroeconomic facts of
the 80' s, hysteresis theories are still in their infancy and need further
development and testing. At the theoretical level, it would be desirable to
consider more complex bargaining structures than those treated so far. An
obvious direction for empirical research is the study of wage behavior at a
disaggregated level. If insider and membership considerations are important,
wages at the sectoral level should depend for example largely on sectoral
conditions as well as or. the previous history of employment in the sector.
Even given our current knowledge, hysteresis models point to different
policy choices from thoss implied by models in which equilibrium unemployment
8is not affected by actual unemployment. They suggest that left to themselves.
7 Because the effect of actual unemployment on equilibrium unemployment is
not permanent in this case, Layard and Nickell have privately objected to the
use of the word hysteresis to describe their theory.
8 We elaborate on this point both in Blanchard and Summers (1986a) and (1986b)
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European economies may remain at high unemployment for the foreseable future.
Regardless of the source of shocks which have led to increased unemployment,
they imply that policies to decrease the actual rate, if successful, would
probably also lead to decreases in the equilibrium rate. Finally, they suggest
that, to succeed, policies must be aimed at reenfranchising the unemployed, in
particular the long term unemployed.
Layard and Nickell (1986) also draw implications of their analysis for policy.
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